Purchase of Note Constitutes Usurious Loan by anon,
Washington Law Review 
Volume 41 Number 4 
8-1-1966 
Purchase of Note Constitutes Usurious Loan 
anon 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr 
 Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
anon, Recent Developments, Purchase of Note Constitutes Usurious Loan, 41 Wash. L. Rev. 914 (1966). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr/vol41/iss4/13 
This Recent Developments is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law 
Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington Law Review by an authorized editor of UW Law 
Digital Commons. For more information, please contact cnyberg@uw.edu. 
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
be resolved in continual litigation. Some more practical solution should
be sought through legislation supported by the Treasury Department.3 7
PURCHASE OF NOTE
CONSTITUTES USURIOUS LOAN
Defendant applied for a loan to an investment broker to whom he
gave a mortgage and a promissory note payable to, and subsequently
endorsed in blank by, a third party. The broker, whose name ap-
peared on neither instrument, then sold the 6,000 dollar note at a
six per cent discount to plaintiff after deducting a commission of
890 dollars. Defendant received only 4,750 dollars for his note. Plain-
tiff did not know that his money constituted the original consideration
for the note, which bore ten per cent annual interest. After defendant's
default, plaintiff brought this action to foreclose the mortgage. The
trial court concluded that the transaction was in substance a usurious
loan and sustained the defense of usury. On appeal, the Washington
Supreme Court affirmed in a five-four decision. Held: The defense
of usury is available to the maker of a note for which no value has
previously been given if it is discounted at a rate which, when added
to stated interest, exceeds the statutory maximum, even though plain-
tiff holder did not know that he furnished the original consideration.
Baske v. Russell, 67 Wash. Dec. 2d 264, 407 P.2d 434 (1965).
The Washington usury statute, limited in application to loans and
forbearances,' does not affect the sale and purchase of negotiable
litigation. Baiter, supra note 5, at 20. The strict burden of proof rule has also
been defended on the ground that the Tax Court itself is not equipped to in-
vestigate and present factual evidence. Morrisdale Coal Mining Co., 19 T.C. 208(1952) ; Producers Crop Improvement Ass'n, 7 T.C. 562 (1946). See 9 MERTENS,
op. cit. supra note 4, § 50.62; Baiter, supra note 5.
' See articles cited note 8 supra, for possible legislative and administrative
solutions to the taxpayer's burden of proof problem in dependency cases. See
also Kaminsky, The Case for Discovery Procedure in the Tax Court, 36 TAXES 498(1958). The problems illustrated by the principal case often could be avoided by
providing in the alimony decree at the time of divorce that child support be
incorporated within alimony payments. The wife would get the dependency exemp-
tion, but the husband would be able to deduct the entire alimony payment. See
Commissioner v. Lester, 366 U.S. 299 (1961).
'WASH. REv. CODE § 19.52.020 (1957) :
Any rate of interest not exceeding twelve percent per annum agreed to in writing
by the parties to the contract, shall be legal, and no person shall directly or indi-
rectly take or receive in money, goods or thing in action, or in any other way, any
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paper, which may be discounted at any rate.2 However, a court must
often scrutinize a transaction to determine whether what was, in form,
a sale and purchase of negotiable paper was, in substance, a usurious
loan.3
The court in the principal case adopted the rule that if a com-
mercial instrument is (1) sold or otherwise transferred at a discount
exceeding the lawful interest rate,4 and is (2) either (a) received di-
rectly from the maker,' or (b) transferred without having been previ-
ously negotiated for value, the transaction is in legal effect a usurious
loan.' The court reasoned that plaintiff's lack of knowledge that the
note had not been previously negotiated for value did not exempt him
from this rule because: "If knowledge on the part of the lender is made
a condition of liability, collusion is invited and the purpose of the
statute is defeated.")7
greater interest, sum or value for the loan or forbearance of any money, goods or
things in action than twelve percent per annum.
"'A sale of commercial paper or other chose in action cannot be construed as
usurious, regardless of the profit made .... " 67 Wash. Dec. 2d at 267, 407 P.2d
at 436. See also Acme Finance Co. v. Zapffe, 161 Wash. 312, 296 Pac. 1050(1931); Finance & Ins. Agency v. Herren, 139 Wash. 499, 247 Pac. 948 (1926).
"To determine whether all these essential elements [of usury] are present, the
courts will look through the form of the transaction and consider its substance."
Hafer v. Spaeth, 22 Wn. 2d 378, 383, 156 P.2d 408, 410 (1945). For the elements of
usury, see note 9 infra. See Ifilana v. Credit Discount Co., 27 Cal. 2d 335, 163 P2d
869, 871 (1945) :[L]enders, intent on collecting compensation for the use of money in excess
of the lawful rate, seek to avoid transacting their business in the form of
loans. The courts have been alert to pierce the veil of any plan designed to
evade the usury law and in doing so to disregard the form and consider the
substance.
See also Annot., Usury as predicable upon transaction in form a sale or exchange of
coin zercial paper or other choses in action, 165 A.L.R. 626, 631-32 (1946), and cases
cited therein.
'The maximum lawful interest in Washington is twelve per cent per annum.
WAsH. REv. CODE § 19.52.020 (1957). The broker's commission was not included
in the court's calculation. The court found usury by adding plaintiff's six per
cent discount to the stated interest of ten per cent, concluding:
If this 6 per cent were spread over the three years in which the note was
to be paid, the annual interest would be 12 per cent-a rate not in excess of that
provided by statute; however, when it is considered that the interest is paid
on a declining balance, whereas the 6 per cent was deducted from the full
amount of the loan, it becomes apparent that the statutory maximum would
be exceeded. 67 Wash. Dec. 2d at 267, 407 P.2d at 436.
It is curious that the court did not at this point cite a parallel provision
contained in WASH. REV. CODE § 19.52.010 (1957): "The discounting of com-
mercial paper, where the borrower makes himself liable as maker, guarantor or
indorser, shall be considered as a loan for the purposes of this act."
'67 Wash. Dec. 2d at 268, 407 P.2d at 436.
" 67 Wash. Dec. 2d at 269, 407 P.2d at 437. Whatever validity "possible col-
lusion" may have as grounds for rendering immaterial a holder's lack of knowledge
that the note he purchased had not been previously negotiated for value, it is
difficult to discern any possibility of collusion on the part of plaintiff in the
principal case. The majority opinion stated three times that plaintiff was un-
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According to the general rule adopted by the court, the transaction
whereby plaintiff unwittingly furnished the original consideration for
defendant's note and mortgage constituted an usurious loan.' It should
be noted, however, that this transaction did not contain all the elements
essential to usury in Washington, for plaintiff neither made a loan nor
intended to exact usurious interest.9 A loan is:
an advancement of money or other personal property to a person,
under a contract or stipulation, express or implied, whereby the person
to whom the advancement is made binds himself to repay it at some
future time, together with such other sum as may be agreed upon for
the use of the money or the thing advanced.10
The Washington court has stated that a cardinal rule in the doctrine
of usury is that "to constitute usury, there must be a loan in con-
templation by the parties . . .. "I' Plaintiff thought he was purchasing
a note. The court did not find that he intended to make a loan; nor
was there any indication that he had entered into a "contract or
stipulation, express or implied," to lend money to defendant. The
court was similarly silent about plaintiff's intent to exact usurious
interest. 2 If, as he thought, plaintiff was purchasing a note which
aware that the money he was advancing was to be the original consideration for
the note. 67 Wash. Dec. 2d at 267-68, 407 P.2d at 435-36. From the majority's
description of the facts, the only collusion which appeared likely was between
the broker and defendant. Both defendant and his third party payee cooperated in
the broker's scheme, the final result being that the broker received a "commission"
of $890 and defendant was enriched by $2,392. 67 Wash. Dec. 2d at 273, 407
P.2d at 439 (dissenting opinion). Due to deduction of penalties under the usury
statute, quoted in note 20 infra, plaintiff received judgment of only $1808.01 on
his plea for $5,751.66, the amount due on the note. Id. at 270, 407 P.2d at 437-38.
' See note 6 supra and accompanying text.
'In addition to (1) a loan or forbearance, express or implied, and (2) an
intent to exact more than the legal maximum for the loan or forbearance, the
essential elements of usury are: (3) money or its equivalent constituting the
subject matter of the loan or forbearance, (4) an understanding betwecn the parties
that the principal shall be repayable absolutely, and (5) the exaction of something
in excess of what is allowed by law for the use of the money loaned or for the
benefit of the forbearance. Colagrossi v. Hendrickson, 50 Wn. 2d 266, 310 P.2d
1072 (1957) ; Hafer v. Spaeth, 22 Wn. 2d 378, 156 P.2d 408 (1945).
" Hafer v. Spaeth, 22 Wn. 2d 378, 384, 156 P.2d 408, 411 (1945).
I1d. at 383, 156 P.2d at 411, quoting with approval from Nichols v. Fearson,32 U.S. 103, 108 (1833).
Such intent is not an intent to violate the statute as such, but is merely an
intent to do what is forbidden by statute. Intentional imposition of more than
twelve per cent annual interest will raise a presumption of intent to charge usury.
Washington Fire Insurance Co. v. Maple Valley Lumber Co., 77 Wash. 686, 138
Pac. 553 (1914).
It has been held, however, that "a contract was not usurious unless, upon reason-
able construction of the terms in view of the dealings of the parties, it is manifest
that the parties intended to engage in a usury transaction." Tacoma Hotel, Inc.
v. Morrison & Co., 193 Wash. 134, 141, 74 P.2d 1003, 1005 (1938), citing Simpson
v. The C.P. Cox Corp., 167 Wash. 34, 8 P.2d 424 (1932). If plaintiff had intended
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had already been negotiated for value, the discount could not be
added to the stated interest in determining the interest rate. 3
The effect of this decision, which ignored plaintiff's status as a
holder in due course, 14 is to carve an exception out of Washington's
negotiable instruments law by subjecting a holder in due course to
the defense of usury, heretofore a personal defense in Washington.' 5
A holder in due course, by definition, has acquired a negotiable in-
to make a loan, therefore, an intent to exact usurious interest could have been
presumed from the fact that he discounted at six per cent a note bearing ten
per cent interest. But he could not be presumed to have intended to exact usurious
interest when he did not even intend to make a loan.
"The majority opinion explicitly conceded: "We hold that a note for which value
has once been given can be discounted at any rate.. . !" 67 Wash. Dec. 2d at 269, 407
P.2d at 437.
See note 2 supra.1 XVNAsH. REv. CODE § 62.01.052 (1955):
A holder in due course is a holder who has taken the instrument under the
following conditions:
(1) That it is complete and regular upon its face;
(2) That he became holder of it before it was overdue, and without notice
that it had been previously dishonored, if such was the fact;
(3) That he took it in good faith and for value;
(4) That at the thie it was negotiated to him he had no nwtice of any infirmity
in the instrument or defect in the title of the person negotiating it. [Emphasis
added.]
From the court's description of the facts, it is clear that plaintiff took the instru-
ment under these conditions.
If the court had accepted the trial court's finding that the broker was plaintiff's
agent in this transaction (Brief for Appellants, p. 3) and its conclusion of law
that plaintiff was chargeable with the broker's knowledge of the true nature of
the transaction (Brief for Appellants, p. 4), plaintiff's imputed knowledge would
have prevented him from being a holder in due course. Keene v. Behan, 40 Wash.
505, 82 Pac. 884 (1905). But see Fry v. Knouse, 142 Wash. 500, 505, 253 Pac.
802, 804 (1927), which held that a broker who had made a usurious loan without
plaintiff's knowledge and later sold the note to plaintiff was plaintiff's agent,
but that his knowledge was not chargeable to plaintiff, for "it was essential
to the agent's purpose that he should conceal the real facts from his principal."
See also Ridgway v. Davenport, 37 Wash. 134, 79 Pac. 606 (1905); WASH. REv.
CODE § 19.52.030 (1957) :
[Tihe acts and dealings of an agent in loaning money shall bind the principal, and
in all cases where there is illegal interest contracted for by the transaction of any
agent the principal shall be held thereby to the same extent as though he had acted
in person. And where the same person acts as agent of the borrower and lender,
he shall be deemed the agent of the lender for the purposes of this act.
The court in the principal case apparently did not accept the trial court's finding of
agency nor did it base its decision on this finding, and nowhere did it imply
that the broker was plaintiff's agent or that plaintiff was chargeable with broker's
knowledge of the true nature of the transaction.
" American Say. Bank & Trust Co. v. Helgesen, 64 Wash. 54, 116 Pac. 837
(1911) ; WASH. Rxv. CODE § 62.01.057 (1955):
A holder in due course holds the instrument free from any defect of title of
prior parties, and free from defenses available to prior parties among them-
selves, and may enforce payment of the instrument for the full amount thereof
against all parties liable thereon.
"Usury, a matter on which there is great variation in state policy, has been held
to be a personal defense in Washington." Cosway, Negotiable Instruments-A
Comparison of Washington Law and Uniform Commercial Code Article 3, 40
WASH. L. REv. 281, 312 n.162 (1965).
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strument without knowledge of facts indicating, inter alia, that the
transaction was in substance a loan, for if he had such knowledge, a
purchaser would not be a holder in due course. Even though an
innocent purchaser is a holder in due course, he may nevertheless be
deemed a usurious lender if knowledge or intent is not necessary to
make a loan.
Availability of usury as a defense against a holder in due course
is dependent upon provisions of the usury statute of each jurisdiction.
In some states usury statutes explicitly exempt a holder in due course
from the defense of usury. 6 Absent such provision, it is generally
held that usury is a defense against a holder in due course to the
extent that a state's usury statute renders void either the entire usur-
ious contract 7 or the interest or excess of interest over the lawful
maximum.'8 But where the statute merely provides a penalty without
voiding the instrument, it is generally held that the defense of usury is
not available against a holder in due course:' 9 this is the rule in Wash-
ington.20
" E.g., KAN. GEN. STAT. 16-203 (Supp. 1961) provides in part:
[N]o bona fide endorsee of negotiable paper purchased before due shall be
affected by any usury exacted by any former holder of such paper unless he
shall have actual notice of the usury previous to his purchase.
'1 Hare v. General Contract Purchase Corp., 220 Ark. 601, 249 S.W.2d 973 (1952),
held that the defense of usury was available against a bona fide holder for value
and without notice for the reason that the Arkansas constitution voids usurious
contracts. Sabine v. Paine, 233 N.Y. 401, 119 N.E. 849 (1918), held that the
New York usury statute, voiding usurious contracts, was not impliedly repealed
or modified by the subsequently enacted New York negotiable instruments law(providing that a holder in due course holds the instrument free from any defect of
title in prior parties and free from defenses available to prior parties among
themselves), and that therefore a note void in its inception for usury could not be
enforced even by a holder in due course.
' Whitaker v. Smith, 255 Ky. 339, 73 S.W.2d 1105 (1934), held that because
the Kentucky statute rendered void the obligation to pay interest in excess of the
lawful maximum, in a suit brought by a holder in due course, defendant maker was
entitled to credit on the note in the amount of the usurious interest he had paid.
A similar rule was followed in National Bond & Investment Co. v Atkinson,
254 S.W.2d 885, 887-88 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952): "Since usurious interest in the
hands of the original payee is void, it logically follows that it continues to be
usurious and void even if the note is in the hands of a bona fide holder."
"Because the Virginia usury statute did not void usurious contracts, the
defense of usury was held not available against plaintiff holder in due course in
Moore v. Potomac Say. Bank; 160 Va. 597, 169 S.E. 922 (1933).
WAsi. Rv. CODE § 19.52.030 (1957) :
If a greater rate of interest than is hereinbefore allowed shall be contracted
for or received or reserved, the contract shall not, therefore, be void; but if in
any action on such contract proof be made that greater rate of interest has
been directly or indirectly contracted for or taken or reserved, the plaintiff
shall only recover the principal, less the amount of interest accruing thereon
at the rate contracted for, and the defendant shall recover costs; and if interest
shall have been paid, judgment shall be for the principal less twice the
amount of the interest paid, and less the amount of all accrued and unpaid
interest ....
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The relationship between a state's usury statute and its negotiable
instruments law is recognized by the Uniform Commercial Code,
which becomes effective in Washington on July 1, 1967. The Code
provides that a holder in due course takes the instrument free from
all defenses of any party to the instrument with whom he has not
dealt, except such illegality as renders void the obligation of that
party. 1 By rejecting this relationship,22 the Washington court has
rendered uncertain the favored status which a holder in due course
heretofore has enjoyed, and which he would have been expected to
enjoy under the Uniform Commercial Code. Close examination of a
negotiable instrument's history will be required prior to its purchase
to ascertain whether it has previously been negotiated for value. Good
faith and lack of knowledge may no longer protect the holder in due
course from the defense of usury.
American Sav. Bank & Trust Co. v. Helgesen, 64 Wash. 54, 61, 116 Pac. 837, 839
(1911):
Since the contracting for a greater rate of interest than is allowed by law
does not render the notes void . . . it seems clear that the defense of usury
is not available to the maker against a holder acquiring the notes in good
faith for value before maturity.
, UNIFORM COMaifERCIAL CODE § 3-305 (2) (b). Comment 6 adds:
Illegality is most frequently a matter of gaming or usury, but may arise in
many other forms under a great variety of statutes. The statutes differ greatly
in their provisions and the interpretations given them. They are primarily
a matter of local concern and local policy. All such matters are therefore
left to the local law. If under that law the effect of the duress or the illegality
is to make the obligation entirely null and void, the defense may be asserted
against a holder in due course. Otherwise it is cut off.
Prior to the principal case, the effect of § 3-305 (2) (b) in Washington, where usurious
contracts are not void by statute, would have been that the defense of usury could not
be raised against a holder in due course. This result is no longer safely predictable, for
under the reasoning of the principal case the possibility of collusion has replaced void-
ness of usurious contracts as ground for subjecting a holder in due course to the
defense of usury.
""Our statute does not make the contract void but simply imposes penalties.
However, we do not think that a distinction based upon the severity of the sanc-
tions imposed by a statute is necessarily valid." 67 Wash. Dec. 2d at 269, 407
P.2d at 437.
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